Talk:Space Shuttle Challenger disaster

Collapsed wall 'o text. WP:NPA.

hello, i'm just putting this section here because it's obvious balon greyjoy has a non-neutral point of view. this is best shown in one of his responses to another section here: @Aeroview854: While that is a valid point, it's easier to look back on the disaster as a failure of politics, while at the time it was viewed as a safe option. While it subsequently came out that there were issues with the O-rings in the 24 preceding flights, the general understanding was that the multiple segment SRBs were a safe option. While the SRBs were redesigned after the disaster, and the cost-benefit of changing manufacturers mid-program can be debated, the engineers and safety personnel associated with the Space Shuttle continued to trust multi-segment SRBs for the rest of the program, and are doing so again on the SLS system. Obviously these people are not perfect and can make mistakes, but it seems difficult to fathom that they would stick with the multi-segment SRB if it is doomed to fail. Balon Greyjoy (talk) 15:49, 28 October 2020 (UTC) it is wrong for greyjoy to claim that "the general understanding was that multiple-segment SRBS were a safe option". this is simply not true. in fact, it was being argued at the time the original award was given (1973) that the solid rocket booster design was flawed. this is why the government accountability office stated that the award should be reconsidered. the GAO did this because when it evaluated the price competitiveness of the Lockheed and Thiokol proposals (found to be similar), they thought the differences in the design warranted reconsideration. In a December 12, 1973, report, NASA selection officials said Thiokol's "cost advantages were substantial and consistent throughout all areas evaluated." 7 They also singled out Thiokol's joint design for special mention. "The Thiokol motor case joints utilized dual O-rings and test ports between seals, enabling a simple leak check without pressurizing the entire motor," the officials' report said. "This innovative design feature increased reliability and decreased operations at the launch site, indicating good attention to low cost (design, development, testing and engineering) and production." 8 "We noted that the [NASA Source Selection] board's analysis of cost factors indicated that Thiokol could do a more economical job than any of the other proposers in both the development and the production phases of the program; and that, accordingly, the cost per flight to be expected from a Thiokol-built motor would be the lowest," the officials said. "We, therefore, concluded that any selection other than Thiokol would give rise to an additional cost of appreciable size." 9 — NASA[1] indeed, the AP writing on this issue in 1986 states The report, released Monday, said it was ″an accident rooted in history″ that began with a poorly designed rocket joint, followed by the failure of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration and its contractors to recognize it as a problem, their failure to fix it and their conclusion it was an acceptable flight risk. — AP[2] per this IEEE spectrum article[3], we learn a few things lockheed stressed that the solid rocket booster design would be a large risk the thiokol design was rated the worst among all proposals, finishing at 124/200 points. the GAO stated there was flawed reasoning for awarding thiokol the contracts (in this case they reference cost, but were aware of lockheed's concerns about safety) Fletcher was aware of the problems and chose to go with thiokol anyways. as late as 1977 there were concerns about the solid rocket booster technology. so mr greyjoy's claim that "SRBs were considered a safe option" was the reason they were awarded the contract, is demonstrably false. i am currently looking for the original 1973 GAO report, but certainly it does not seem this design was ever considered safe at the time it was issued. it's possible the GAO report does not mention safety since the cost-effectiveness of thiokol's proposal, which was the primary reason they were awarded the contract, should have been sufficient to compel NASA to reconsider lockheed. but as it is infamously known: NASA did not and it had disastrous consequences. essentially i'm gathering is that the cost effectiveness was SO attractive that NASA overlooked any potential safety concerns from their design. and even when the GAO recommended reconsideration on the primary basis of cost-effectiveness in their 1973 report, it seemingly was not enough to change things (looking for this report, still). as LATE as 1977, there were concerns about the design. mr greyjoy seems to baselessly revert as he is aware this information will get more exposure on this page, as opposed to the ones he's recommending (the manufacturer's page, for example). edit: i am in the process of tracking down the 1973 GAO report. per the esteemed book Challenger: a major malfunction[4] this report is 98 pages. in my search of the GAO archives (from 1/1/1973 to 31/12/1974) i could not find such a report[5]. dianne vaughn's book on this disaster[6] claims the GAO announced the decision on 22 June 1974. broadening the search on the GAO archives to all released documents in that date range[7] did not yield this report. i have formally made the request for this comprehensive study because i feel it probably did touch on the rocket design differences, but in the framework of the original scoring of the proposals. greyjoy poked the wrong bear 198.53.108.48 (talk) 21:09, 25 July 2021 (UTC)[reply] 198.53.108.48 (talk · contribs · WHOIS) Looking to clear up some of the confusion we have here between us. The main concern I have is the relevance of a 1973 investigation into why Thiokol was picked over other bidders when it comes to the actual Challenger disaster. I'm not disputing the possibility of favoritism on the part of Fletcher for selecting Thiokol, but this article is not about the details of how the Space Shuttle was designed and contracted out (as Space Shuttle design process is). Yes, the two-ring system was useful for leak checks, as noted by Fletcher, but also by McDonald and the Rogers Commission; there is nothing new added from the Fletcher quote. I'm also not disputing the safety of solid-rocket boosters, but it's not like Thiokol was the only company to propose an SRB design, so Thiokol's selection as a contractor wasn't the only reason the Space Shuttle had SRBs. As evidenced in other sources in this article, Thiokol and NASA both had unsafe practices that ultimately led to this disaster, and while it can be noted that there may have been some shady business practices in selecting Thiokol for SRB production and maintenance, it does not require a sub-section discussing a long-closed inconclusive investigation. This isn't in some effort to squash alternate theories or minimize their exposure, but rather to keep only information that falls under WP:SCOPE. Information shouldn't be on this page only because it will get more exposure than if it is on a less-viewed page. Additionally, I request that you follow WP:FOC when making these types of discussions. Debate is healthy, but accusations ("it's obvious balon greyjoy has a non-neutral point of view") and combative tone ("greyjoy poked the wrong bear") have no place here or the rest of Wikipedia; this isn't some competition for one of us to WP:WIN. Most disturbing is your edit summary that includes "bang bang, greyjoy's dead" from this diff. I have added the appropriate warning to your user talk page. Balon Greyjoy (talk) 07:19, 26 July 2021 (UTC)[reply] @Balon Greyjoy: there is no attack. the 'bang bang, greyjoy is dead' is a play on words from the song Kill Bill vol. 1. it was never intended to convey any kind of bodily harm, and i apologise if you interpreted it that way. i was merely conveying my confidence in the evidentiary basis supporting the idea the GAO report in 1973 was critical. i agree the page should focus on the disaster but i feel the first GAO report (i have requested it, i may have to call them to get confirmation) was so important and the dismissal of its recommendations was a direct cause of the disaster. the second one was less important but it is directly related to the blurb on the congressional investigation so i briefly touched on it by just stating their conclusion. i disagree that the first report was inconclusive. many of the sources i provide above support that claim. you may be right the second report was inconclusive, but again since it is relevant to the congressional hearings i thought it would be good to mention their conclusion. i also feel that you're underplaying certain aspects of what caused the disaster. you sound like a 'rocket buff', so i will not really contest whether there were other designs at that time since this area i find this area boring (no offence). what i did want to highlight is, it does not seem solid rocket boosters are the same as solid rocket motors. is that a fair claim? the link you're sharing suggests all contractors had solid rocket motor designs, but not so for the booster. the lockheed proposal seems to suggest the SRB design at that time would be risky. so i am at a loss as to how you can say they were considered safe. maybe in the general context, but not so in the context of the RFP? i think i called the wrong number yesterday. i found the right point of contact. mr timothy bowling, whom i've emailed. if i don't hear within two days i'll shoot him a call.

IP, I collapsed the wall of text above; no one is going to read it. Please focus on content, not editors, and be concise. Regarding this proposed edit, an expose on Mormons doesn't seem like a very good source for a technical article. Any other sources that would establish whether this coverage meets WP:DUE? Calling the GAO does not meet our requirement for verifiability. VQuakr (talk) 22:57, 26 July 2021 (UTC)[reply]

@VQuakr: it is your own fault if you did not read any of the sources i've provided. all of them corroborate exactly what the source says. you claim the book source isn't appropriate, but as the sources above show: it is clearly appropriate. i have reworked my insertion and used the sources provided in the arguments above, in addition to the original. Anson D. Schupe seems to be a pretty good author if he has a wikipedia page. nothing on his page suggests he is a conspiracy theorist. i should mention: to come in a discussion and simply say "no one is going to read that", revert someone's edits, after it seems both sides reached an agreement, is both rude and disingenuous. you shouldn't involve yourself in a discussion that two parties were in the process of solving. we were about to talk about the differences in rocket motors vs boosters and you just come in out of nowhere and stomp on everything. further, the GAO report is valid. all of the sources above are WP:secondary and sufficient for the edit to stay. the only reason i am asking for the original 1973 report is for my own information. the report itself is not required to dispute relevance which was the basis of the original reversion. the 1973 report would provide welcome insight as to what the GAO said exactly, in addition to the cost effectiveness angle. it has been alleged more than once NASA made a cost/safety decision — Preceding unsigned comment added by 198.53.108.48 (talk • contribs)

Focus on content. I'm not the only editor to take issue with the proposed add, and the onus is on you to establish consensus for inclusion. This seems like coatracking to me; as proposed I don't think it should be included. The GAO investigation after the disaster was focused on a conflict of interest and is quite tangential to the subject of the incident itself. VQuakr (talk) 06:11, 27 July 2021 (UTC)[reply]

198.53.108.48 (talk · contribs · WHOIS) Couple points to address:

I hope that clears some of this up; looking forward to getting past this WP:EDITWAR and on to improving the article. Balon Greyjoy (talk) 06:22, 27 July 2021 (UTC)[reply]

@Balon Greyjoy: re Vquakr if others want to participate, fine, but often they just insert a colon below the last line and sign their text. this guy decided he wanted it to go a certain way, telling me "no one is going to read that". well, this is apparently an encyclopaedia. sometimes adding or building upon knowledge requires reading, often lots of it. i am not sure shupe is a scientology-associated scientist. i did see that though, and point taken. however it is quite telling the content of his book led me to sources that support everything he was saying. that is the important part, but okay let's leave shupe aside for a sec and deal with the main issue.

i disagree with the idea the 1973 GAO report should be moved to another section. if you want to remove the 1986 congressional investigation and such, that's fine. what i feel you're missing is the GAO report serves as the first documented sign of problems. that is why i feel it deserves a section. the o-rings and joints are just one part of the concerns that were raised in 1973. what is important is how fletcher dealt with these concerns. he was given an opportunity to reconsider awarding the contract and he did not. this, in my view, is something you are overlooking. the conduct of fletcher in dealing with this report is also noteworthy. this is not political. the GAO report recommended a reconsideration, and the sources strongly support that fletcher adopted an attitude or position that was not defensible in light of the evidence put before him (especially the adjusted costs that made the proposals approximately equal).

so the question is, how do both sides converge? as it relates to the citation style, i don't care. you can change that any way you'd like.

an update: i have read the 1973 report in its entirety,^[8] it is nothing short of outstanding and a testament to what america can be. it addresses the every single concern raised by lockheed in great detail. before providing the noteworthy passages as they pertain to this discussion, i want to briefly mention that the approach taking by the source evaluation board was one that used costs as an overall measure. that is if corrections were needed to deficiencies, they were scored accordingly and then the costs to compensate were separately adjusted. here are the passages i feel are noteworthy:

• MISSION SUITABILITY

THE SEB DESIGN TEAM HAD THE PRIMARY TASK OF REVIEWING EACH OFFEROR'S PROPOSAL FOR SUSPECTED DESIGN STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES AND THE ADDITIONAL TASK OF PROPOSING METHODS TO CORRECT ANY DEFICIENCIES FOUND. A DISTINCTION MUST, HOWEVER, BE DRAWN BETWEEN THESE FUNCTIONS. FIRST, EACH SPECIFIC DESIGN STRENGTH AND WEAKNESS, AND THE RELATIVE MAGNITUDE OF IT, WAS REPORTED BY THE DESIGN TEAM TO THE SEB AS AN AID IN NUMERICALLY SCORING THE PROPOSALS IN THE DESIGN AREA. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT NO SEB-CORRECTED DESIGN FEATURES WERE SUBMITTED TO THE SEB FOR SCORING SINCE ONLY THE PROPOSALS TOGETHER WITH THE DESIGN TEAM'S LISTING OF EACH PROPOSER'S INDEPENDENT DESIGN STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES WERE USED IN THE SEB DESIGN EVALUATION. FURTHERMORE, THE IMPACT OF THE DESIGN TEAM'S SECOND FUNCTION - DESIGN CORRECTION - WENT ULTIMATELY ONLY TO COST ADJUSTMENT - BOTH DIRECTLY (E.G., WHERE ADDITIONAL MATERIAL IS REQUIRED) AND INDIRECTLY (E.G., WHERE AN ADDITIONAL MANUFACTURING STEP IS REQUIRED TO EFFECT THE CHANGE INDICATED AS NECESSARY BY THE DESIGN TEAM).

• LOCKHEED'S CONTENTIONS re: MISSION SUITABILITY

THE THIOKOL CASE DESIGN MET THE GENERAL SRM REQUIREMENTS; HOWEVER, THE CYLINDRICAL SEGMENT (FOR ALTERNATE WATER IMPACT LOADS) WAS CLOSE TO THE UPPER LIMITS OF SIZE CAPABILITY OF THE CASE FABRICATOR. THE NOZZLE DESIGN INCLUDED ABLATIVE MATERIALS NOT CURRENTLY DEVELOPED OR CHARACTERIZED. THIS OFFERED POTENTIAL SAVINGS IN PROGRAM COST, BUT WITH ATTENDANT TECHNICAL AND PROGRAM RISK. AN EXPANDED CHARACTERIZATION AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM WOULD BE REQUIRED. THE THICKNESS OF THE NOZZLE MATERIAL WAS INSUFFICIENT TO MEET REQUIRED SAFETY FACTORS AND THUS DEGRADED RELIABILITY. THE AMOUNT OF MATERIAL REQUIRED TO CORRECT THE DEFICIENCY WAS SUBSTANTIAL AND THE DEFICIENCY COULD REQUIRE A REDESIGN OF THE METAL PORTIONS AS WELL AS THE ABLATIVE PORTIONS. THE DESIGN WAS COMPLEX AND WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO DIFFICULTY IN MANUFACTURING. THE THIOKOL MOTOR CASE JOINTS UTILIZED DUAL O-RINGS AND TEST PORTS BETWEEN SEALS, ENABLING A SIMPLE LEAK CHECK WITHOUT PRESSURIZING THE ENTIRE MOTOR. THIS INNOVATIVE DESIGN FEATURE INCREASED RELIABILITY AND DECREASED OPERATIONS AT THE LAUNCH SITE, INDICATING GOOD ATTENTION TO LOW COST DDT&E AND PRODUCTION. THE THICKNESS OF THE INTERNAL INSULATION IN THE CASE AFT DOME WAS MARGINAL AND CREATED A TECHNICAL RISK.

• SEB conclusions re: MISSION SUITABILITY

PRECISELY, BOTH THE DESIGN TEAM AND THE SEB CHARACTERIZED THIOKOL'S LOW-COST MATERIAL AS A DESIGN WEAKNESS OF SOME IMPORT AND MADE A COST ADJUSTMENT FOR ADDITIONAL DEVELOPMENTAL TESTING DEEMED NECESSARY TO ALLOW FOR THE POSSIBLE USE OF THIS LOW-COST MATERIAL AND MADE ANOTHER ADJUSTMENT RELATIVE TO THE CONTINGENCY THAT ONLY CONVENTIONAL MATERIAL (A THIOKOL PROPOSED ALTERNATE APPROACH) COULD BE USED. THE INADEQUATE THICKNESS OF THIOKOL'S NOZZLE MATERIAL ALSO RESULTED IN AN EVALUATED WEAKNESS WITH COST IMPACT. FURTHERMORE, THIOKOL'S NOZZLE COMPLEXITY WAS ESTABLISHED AS A WEAKNESS BOTH IN DESIGN AND IN MANUFACTURING AS THE THIOKOL NOZZLE DESIGN WAS CONSIDERED TO BE ONE OF THE MOST DIFFICULT OF THE NOZZLES PROPOSED TO MANUFACTURE. AN ADJUSTMENT TO THE APPROPRIATE THIOKOL LEARNING CURVE WAS MADE BY THE SEB TO MORE ACCURATELY REFLECT THIS DIFFICULTY OF MANUFACTURING THE THIOKOL NOZZLE. OF COURSE, THIS ADJUSTMENT TO THE THIOKOL LEARNING CURVE HAD THE ADDITIONAL EFFECT OF INCREASING THE NUMBER OF MAN-HOURS REQUIRED TO MANUFACTURE THE NOZZLE AND HENCE THE COST OF MANUFACTURE.

• GAO conclusion re: MISSION SUITABILITY

THE SEB GAVE THIOKOL'S PROPOSAL WEAKNESSES BOTH IN DESIGN AND IN MANUFACTURING BECAUSE ITS COMPLEX NOZZLE CONTAINED A LARGE NUMBER OF PARTS WHICH WOULD NOT LEND ITSELF TO EASY FABRICATION. ON THE OTHER HAND, FOR ITS SUBMISSION OF AN UNMANUFACTURABLE ALTERNATE CASE, THIOKOL WAS GIVEN A DEFICIENCY ONLY IN MANUFACTURING FOR ITS RESPONSE TO THE ALTERNATE WATER IMPACT LOAD.

SINCE THE FAILURE TO SUBMIT A READILY PRODUCIBLE END PRODUCT IS LIKEWISE A DESIGN ERROR WHICH LEADS TO PROBLEMS IN MANUFACTURING, WE BELIEVE THAT THE SEB, CONSISTENT WITH ITS EVALUATION OF NOZZLE COMPLEXITY, SHOULD HAVE ASSESSED THIOKOL WITH AN ADDITIONAL WEAKNESS IN DESIGN. WE NOTE THAT, IN ANOTHER AREA, THIOKOL WAS ASSESSED FAVORABLY IN BOTH DESIGN AND PRODUCT SUPPORT FOR ITS PROPOSED USE OF A CERTAIN TYPE AND DESIGN OF CASE SEGMENT SEALS. CONSISTENCY WOULD SEEM TO REQUIRE THAT DESIGN DETAILS WHICH IMPACT ON MANUFACTURING, REFURBISHMENT AND/OR PRODUCT SUPPORT SHOULD BE REFLECTED, EITHER AS STRENGTHS OR WEAKNESSES, OR BOTH, IN DESIGN AND IN THE OTHER AREAS AFFECTED.

WE THEREFORE QUESTION THE SEB'S FAILURE TO ASSESS THIOKOL A WEAKNESS RELATIVE TO ALTERNATE CASE DESIGN. MOREOVER, WHERE THE DESIGN TEAM HAS RECOGNIZED AS A WEAKNESS THE FACT THAT THIOKOL PROPOSED THE USE OF A CERTAIN TYPE OF METAL FOR PARTS OF THE NOZZLE WHICH COULD HAVE AN IMPACT ON THE REFURBISHABILITY OF THESE PARTS, IT WOULD APPEAR THAT A CONCURRENT NOTATION OF WEAKNESS WOULD ALSO BECOME NECESSARY IN REFURBISHMENT.

overall the report is superb. i feel the GAO kind of pussyfoots around certain things because they're supposed to be impartial. however the main point is concerns over design were raised. the GAO sheepishly stated that the costs were adjusted and the points were deducted, reflecting the overall utility-theoretic approach, but this did not truly put safety at the forefront. i feel the most "crushing" part of the lockheed proposal was their insistence on having new facilities for the ammonium perchlorate, which did necessitate some higher upfront costs, but are we talking about safety, or costs? the GAO does state NASA warned lockheed that higher upfront costs would be seen as unfavourable on three separate seminars prior to the RFP. however it is tragic that lockheed was right and this entire situation was actually over costs instead of a true consideration of safety. costs are the clear concern throughout the GAO report as well. the skinny: the overall theme coming from the GAO report was that NASA chose to romanticise the Thiokol proposal because lockheed had been told that higher starting costs would hurt their proposal (three separate times). this is not about safety, but about fitting things within a budget. even with all of that said, the costs were determined to be approximately equal and NASA still chose the riskier option. to me this feels like it was due to the higher starting costs that are emphasised throughout the report to build the perchlorate facilities. i'm open to others' view on this report. i do feel it should be cited in the main article. it is very good. i was actually impressed, and that's very hard to do these days (to many people's chagrin). 198.53.108.48 (talk)

As far as I can tell, all this report tells us based upon the SEB/GAO conclusions is that Thiokol underestimated its program costs when submitting a bid, and there was concern over why they were selected despite it being obvious that their projected costs were not in line with reality. While this is a part of the history of the SRB and Space Shuttle, this GAO report is not some sort of smoking gun that reveals Thiokol was on the road to disaster in 1973. Allan McDonald's book and the Rogers Commission are not shy about pointing fingers at Morton-Thiokol, and they are hardly saints in this narrative, but this GAO report does not add to or change the story of the design defects that caused the Challenger disaster. Balon Greyjoy (talk) 06:30, 28 July 2021 (UTC)[reply]

by in large, i agree with your interpretation of the report. however what i do think you're omitting are the following facts

• we agree the GAO does focus on the costs and concluded both lockheed and thiokol's proposals fell within a margin that considered their costs equal. we will likely both agree this is one of the main reasons for the recommendation to reconsider the award
• we agree that the report does not act as a 'smoking gun' regarding thiokol and whether they were on the road to disaster. however the conduct of the SSO is what should be of focus here, which i think is what warrants its own section (and sorry to belabour this point)
• the SSO (fletcher) originally chose thiokol due to their cost effectiveness.
• the GAO report states they were less-experienced, but also said that lockheed had no advantage because the deliverables had never been manufactured:

LOCKHEED MAINTAINS THAT THIOKOL LACKS EXPERIENCE IN FABRICATING NOZZLES, PARTICULARLY NOZZLES OF THE SIZE AND QUANTITY NECESSARY TO SATISFY THE PRODUCT OR REQUIREMENTS OF THE CONTRACT. LOCKHEED CONTRASTS THE THIOKOL LIMITED EXPERIENCE TO THE EXTENSIVE EXPERIENCE OF SEVERAL QUALIFIED VENDORS ON PRODUCTION PROGRAMS AND ON LARGE DEVELOPMENT NOZZLES.

WE QUESTIONED NASA AND THIOKOL ON THE EXTENT TO WHICH THIOKOL AND OTHER FABRICATORS HAVE EXPERTISE IN NOZZLE PRODUCTION. WE ALSO EXAMINED THIOKOL'S PROPOSAL AND THE SEB RECORDS. WE CONCLUDE THAT NO NOZZLE MANUFACTURER HAS FABRICATED NOZZLES IN A PRODUCTION PROGRAM IN ANY WAY COMPARABLE TO THE SIZE, TYPE, AND QUANTITY REQUIRED FOR THE SRM. THIS OBSERVATION IS SUPPORTED BY THE FOLLOWING PASSAGE FROM A LETTER OF MAY 13, 1974, TO LOCKHEED FROM A QUALIFIED NOZZLE VENDOR STATING IN PART:

SINCE A NOZZLE PRODUCTION PROGRAM COMPARABLE TO THE SRM IN SIZE, COMPLEXITY, DURATION, AND DELIVERY REQUIREMENTS HAS NOT BEEN ACCOMPLISHED TO DATE, ACTUAL COST CURVE DATA IS NOT AVAILABLE.

THEREFORE, IT APPEARS THAT WHICHEVER "EXPERIENCED" NOZZLE FABRICATOR WOULD PRODUCE THE NOZZLE, SOME DEVELOPMENT OF NEW EXPERTISE AND A NEW EXPERIENCE BASE WOULD BE REQUIRED.

A REVIEW OF THIOKOL'S PROPOSAL, THE SEB RECORDS, AND THE SUPPLEMENTARY DATA SUBMITTED SUPPORTS THE SEB'S CONCLUSION THAT THIOKOL POSSESSES BASIC EXPERTISE AND EXPERIENCE IN THE FABRICATION OF NOZZLES. WE ARE PARTICULARLY IMPRESSED BY THIOKOL'S (1) FABRICATION EXPERIENCE WITH FLEXIBLE BEARINGS - A KEY COMPONENT IN THE SRM NOZZLE; (2) EXTENSIVE NOZZLE DESIGN PARTICIPATION; (3) MANUFACTURE OF VARIOUS SMALL NOZZLES AND PLASTIC NOZZLES; AND (4) EXPERIENCE IN POSEIDON AND TRIDENT TEST NOZZLES, AS WELL AS ANTICIPATED PRODUCTION FOLLOW-ON CONTRACTS WHICH ARE EXPECTED TO BE COMPLETED BEFORE THE SRM NOZZLES ARE SCHEDULED FOR FABRICATION.

IN VIEW THEREOF, WE FIND A REASONABLE APPLICATION OF JUDGMENT BY THE SEB IN TREATING THIOKOL'S NOZZLE SIZE EXPERIENCE AS ONLY A MINOR WEAKNESS IN MANUFACTURING. WHILE SOME VENDORS MIGHT HAVE MORE PRODUCTION EXPERIENCE WITH NOZZLES LARGER THAN THOSE PREVIOUSLY MANUFACTURED BY THIOKOL, WE CANNOT SAY THAT NOZZLE FABRICATION BY THIOKOL WOULD REPRESENT THE DEVELOPMENT OF NEW EXPERTISE. IN ANY EVENT, THE RFP DID NOT PROHIBIT THE DEVELOPMENT OF NEW EXPERTISE, BUT PROVIDED THAT NEW EXPERTISE "IS TO BE AVOIDED TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE." THEREFORE, WE BELIEVE THAT THIOKOL'S DECISION TO FABRICATE THE NOZZLE IN-HOUSE DID NOT DEVIATE FROM ANY RFP REQUIREMENT. CONSEQUENTLY, THE CREDIT GIVEN FOR THIS COST-SAVING DECISION BY THE SEB IN MANAGEMENT EVALUATION APPEARS PROPER. IN ANY EVENT, THE SEB RECORDS REVEAL THAT THE THIOKOL NOZZLE DECISION, WHILE RATED A MANAGEMENT STRENGTH, WAS NOT AMONG THE PRINCIPAL REASONS FOR THIOKOL'S SIGNIFICANT ADVANTAGE ATTAINED IN THE MANAGEMENT EVALUATION.

as i said, i agree with you there is no smoking gun. however it is quite telling the GAO evaluated the possibility of requiring 'new expertise' did not deviate from the RFP requirements, but this was to be avoided. this strengthens my view that, while this is not a smoking gun, it strongly showed thiokol was not in a position to reliably produce what was being proposed.

• the SSO was informed by the GAO the proposal fell within some range that allowed their costs to be considered equal
• the SSO, in light of thiokol's proposed cost-effectiveness being negated and the fact they had to develop 'new expertise', upheld his original decision.
• the SSO upheld his original decision and opted for the inferior proposal from a less-experienced manufacturer

i therefore stand by my original argument of why this report deserves its own section, concurring with you in part about this report not being a 'smoking gun'. the SSO's response to the report is what makes it so. why would you select the inferior candidate when the costs were determined as equal (upfront perchlorate plant costs from lockheed withstanding)? makes no sense. anyways i want to integrate some of the meat from this GAO report into the blurb. how do you recommend i do this without creating large chunks of text in the body of the article? i feel the passages i'm sharing above are very helpful and maybe a few of them can help readers if they want to check footnotes. see how productive this conversation became/is becoming?198.53.108.48 (talk) 17:31, 28 July 2021 (UTC)[reply]

As I have stated previously, this is relevant information on pages such as the Space Shuttle design process and Space Shuttle Solid Rocket Booster, but not the Challenger disaster page. This page is not here to explain the decisions made during Space Shuttle program unless they pertain directly to the accident. O-ring degradation is relevant to the disaster, but a critique of the use of SRBs and awarding contracts to Thiokol is not within the WP:SCOPE of this article. In the same way, the Space Shuttle Columbia disaster article should discuss what damaged the thermal protection system, but it is not a critique of the decision to use the TPS on a spaceplane rather than an ablative heat shield on a capsule design. I'm happy to give you feedback on incorporating this information into other articles, but my opinion that the GAO report is outside of the scope of this article has not changed. Balon Greyjoy (talk) 07:40, 29 July 2021 (UTC)[reply]

I agree with Balon Greyjoy. The relevance of this material to this article hasn't been established. IP, please also see WP:VNOT: there is no obligation to include this material here. VQuakr (talk) 15:04, 29 July 2021 (UTC)[reply]

there is no applicability of WP:VNOT here, @VQuakr:. the entirety of the content is sourced by reliable material. the question isn't about verifiability. just stay out of this and let him and i work this out. we don't need your involvement with vacuous invocations of WP: rules. as it stands, this is not about verifiability. in fact, it shows just how uninvolved you are in this discussion. butt out, we'll figure it out. @Balon Greyjoy: what you're claiming isn't consistent with the material of the article though. the investigations are relevant because they pertain to the disaster, right? then, the 1986 GAO report is relevant on the basis it was ordered out of this congressional investigation right? i mean, it is the basis that congress relied upon. maybe not in its own section, but i am sure it is of use somewhere. in terms of the 1973 GAO report. okay, i understand what you're saying in terms of the tendering process not being relevant since there is no direct relationship to the disaster. however you say the O-ring degradation is relevant, right? then, per the GAO report:

LOCKHEED ASSERTS THAT THE SSO'S SELECTION STATEMENT ESTABLISHES THAT THE THIOKOL DESIGN DEFICIENCIES WERE MAJOR AND NOT READILY CORRECTABLE.

THE PERTINENT PORTION OF THE STATEMENT SAYS:

THE THIOKOL CASE DESIGN MET THE GENERAL SRM REQUIREMENTS; HOWEVER, THE CYLINDRICAL SEGMENT (FOR ALTERNATE WATER IMPACT LOADS) WAS CLOSE TO THE UPPER LIMITS OF SIZE CAPABILITY OF THE CASE FABRICATOR. THE NOZZLE DESIGN INCLUDED ABLATIVE MATERIALS NOT CURRENTLY DEVELOPED OR CHARACTERIZED. THIS OFFERED POTENTIAL SAVINGS IN PROGRAM COST, BUT WITH ATTENDANT TECHNICAL AND PROGRAM RISK. AN EXPANDED CHARACTERIZATION AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM WOULD BE REQUIRED. THE THICKNESS OF THE NOZZLE MATERIAL WAS INSUFFICIENT TO MEET REQUIRED SAFETY FACTORS AND THUS DEGRADED RELIABILITY. THE AMOUNT OF MATERIAL REQUIRED TO CORRECT THE DEFICIENCY WAS SUBSTANTIAL AND THE DEFICIENCY COULD REQUIRE A REDESIGN OF THE METAL PORTIONS AS WELL AS THE ABLATIVE PORTIONS. THE DESIGN WAS COMPLEX AND WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO DIFFICULTY IN MANUFACTURING. THE THIOKOL MOTOR CASE JOINTS UTILIZED DUAL O-RINGS AND TEST PORTS BETWEEN SEALS, ENABLING A SIMPLE LEAK CHECK WITHOUT PRESSURIZING THE ENTIRE MOTOR. THIS INNOVATIVE DESIGN FEATURE INCREASED RELIABILITY AND DECREASED OPERATIONS AT THE LAUNCH SITE, INDICATING GOOD ATTENTION TO LOW COST DDT&E AND PRODUCTION. THE THICKNESS OF THE INTERNAL INSULATION IN THE CASE AFT DOME WAS MARGINAL AND CREATED A TECHNICAL RISK.

so lockheed did assert the exact point of failure that caused the disaster would be a risk, further

IT IS TRUE, AS NOTED BY THE SSO, THE SEB AND THE DESIGN TEAM, THAT THERE WERE DEFICIENCIES IN THE THIOKOL DESIGN. NEVERTHELESS, WE DO NOT FEEL THAT THE THIOKOL PROPOSAL CONTAINED MAJOR DESIGN DEFICIENCIES.

PURSUANT TO THE SENSE OF THE SOURCE EVALUATION PLAN, MAJOR DESIGN DEFICIENCIES ENVISAGE ONLY THOSE WEAKNESSES WHICH HAVE A SIGNIFICANT IMPACT ON THE SRM'S ABILITY TO PERFORM ACCEPTABLY WITHIN THE RFP PARAMETERS AND ARE NOT WITHIN, OR ARE MARGINALLY WITHIN, THE PROPOSER'S CAPABILITY TO CORRECT IN A TIME FRAME CONSISTENT WITH PROJECT MILESTONES. DEFICIENCIES OF THE MAGNITUDE NOTED ABOVE CLEARLY ARE NOT READILY CORRECTABLE BY THE PROPOSER AND MAY NOT BE CORRECTABLE. ACCORDINGLY, ANY PROJECTION OF CORRECTION COST OF A MAJOR DESIGN DEFICIENCY WOULD BE AN EXERCISE IN UNCERTAINTY, WITH A RESULTING DEGRADATION OF THE VIABILITY OF THE ENTIRE EVALUATION PROCESS. ADDITIONALLY, A MAJOR DESIGN DEFICIENCY WOULD CLEARLY IMPLY THAT, IN THE ABSENCE OF AN INPUT OF NASA EXPERTISE, THE PROPOSER COULD NOT READILY MODIFY ITS DESIGN SO AS TO HAVE IT CONSIDERED ACCEPTABLE.

WHILE WE NOTE THE IMPACT OF BOTH THE QUANTITY AND THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THIOKOL'S DESIGN DEFICIENCIES, WE DO NOT FEEL THAT ANY SINGLE DEFICIENCY, OR EVEN THE WEAKNESSES TAKEN AS A WHOLE, CAN FAIRLY BE CATEGORIZED AS MAJOR DESIGN DEFICIENCIES SO AS TO CAST DOUBT ON THE PROPRIETY OF THE SEB DESIGN EVALUATING CORRECTION PROCESS. WE AGREE WITH LOCKHEED THAT "IT IS IMPROBABLE THAT NASA COULD HAVE SELECTED A PROPOSAL PER SE WITH MAJOR TECHNICAL WEAKNESSES ***" AND WE CONCLUDE THAT NASA DID NOT DO SO.

thus, we see the GAO deferred to the SEB evaluation, even though it agreed the deficiencies pointed out by lockheed did exist. it refrained from 'casting doubt on the proprietary of the seb design evaluating correction process', in spite of the deficiencies that were agreed to exist. this is directly related to the accident. here, lockheed's complaint directly relates to what led to the failure the GAO opted to pussyfoot around the reality of what lockheed was alleging (which turned out to be 100% correct). even if we want to assume that the original SEB assessment thought this deficiency was correctable (we'll see if the FOIP for the documents is cheap, but i want the full breakdown of each category), then it is still relevant because the cause of the disaster was acknowledged as a weakness in the tendering process. can you explain how the cause of the disaster (o-rings), which was acknowldged as a deficiency by the SEB (and further alleged to be a major design flaw by lockheed), is not relevant when the report addresses it? 198.53.108.48 (talk) 17:42, 29 July 2021 (UTC)[reply]

WP:VNOT stands for "Verifiability does not guarantee inclusion". Verifiability was not the point; relevance is. You do not get to decide who is involved in a discussion. The GAO quotes you note above refer to program risk (such as cost and schedule overruns), not risk of catastrophic failure during a launch. This is intuitive since the GAO would not specialize in technical review. '73 The GAO report, as you quote above, actually notes the o-ring system as a feature, not a risk to safety. Your synthesis about whether the GAO should have interpreted Lockheed's concerns differently isn't relevant. The '86 report is tangentially related to the disaster, to the extent that it probably wouldn't have been written if the disaster had not occurred. But its focus was not on the disaster and the relevance doesn't work backwards, so it does not warrant mention in this article. VQuakr (talk) 18:32, 29 July 2021 (UTC)[reply]

198.53.108.48 (talk · contribs · WHOIS) Couple points from me:

1. As I've stated before, it is troubling that you are stating that VQuakr should not be participating in this discussion. Using phrases like "just stay out of this and let him and i work this out", "we don't need your involvement with vacuous invocations of WP", and "butt out, we'll figure it out" are not terms to encourage multiple parties to participate. Oftentimes, having third parties weigh in on a discussion is the only way a situation gets resolved when the original two parties are unable to come to an agreement, which I would say is the case for this situation.
2. While it can sometimes feel that editors throw around around random references to Wikipedia and Manual of Style pages, that doesn't mean they can be written off as nonsensical argument. I think that WP:VNOT is applicable here; there is no argument against the verifiability of the GAO reports, but the discussion is about the inclusion in this article.
3. I think VQuakr has stated my position better than I could, so I won't restate their comments, but I agree with them.

I consider this matter settled for the time being. We have each discussed our own positions, and received outside input to help achieve consensus. Balon Greyjoy (talk) 07:20, 30 July 2021 (UTC)[reply]

@VQuakr: nice to see something substantive come from you, for once. you state: "The GAO quotes you note above refer to program risk (such as cost and schedule overruns), not risk of catastrophic failure during a launch. This is intuitive since the GAO would not specialize in technical review" and "Your synthesis about whether the GAO should have interpreted Lockheed's concerns differently isn't relevant." does it matter who issues the warning? i agree the GAO does not specialise in technical review. however the design was rated as 124/200 points, the worst of all applicants. how does that not factor into the discussion here? the GAO recommended a reconsideration after finding the cost differences between proposals was overstated, and i just can't see how fletcher's choice to stick with thiokol (rated the worst design) did not contribute to the disaster. can you explain how this is synthesis now? the lowest-scoring design got the award in spite of negligible cost differences? certainly you can make the argument the SSO did not fully consider awarding the contract to the proposal with a much stronger design score. 198.53.108.48 (talk) 17:38, 30 July 2021 (UTC)[reply]

Stop needling. Again, GAO's rating was addressing program risk, not concern that the concept was dangerous. Nothing relevant to the subject of this article has been presented, and your linking the two of them is an original synthesis that we can't use in the article. VQuakr (talk) 18:38, 30 July 2021 (UTC)[reply]

@VQuakr: the rating is from the SEB and not the GAO, but your point is unchanged. however, i am not clear why the safety warning in lockheed's complaint is not relevant. is it because the GAO, in their deference to the SEB, did not agree? 198.53.108.48 (talk) 18:47, 30 July 2021 (UTC)[reply]

You quoted Lockheed's concern with the Thiokol nozzle design above, but the SRB nozzles were not a factor in the Challenger disaster. If Lockheed communicated a safety concern specific to o-rings, can you please provide (/re-provide) a link? VQuakr (talk) 19:28, 30 July 2021 (UTC)[reply]

@VQuakr: no, i cannot at this time. i am waiting for the GAO to get back to my FOIA request so i am able to read the entire lockheed complaint. if that complaint does mention this, would the relevance be established? i assume so? 198.53.108.48 (talk) 19:36, 30 July 2021 (UTC)[reply]

The specific proposed edit (in the "Investigation" section) still wouldn't work since anything before 1986 still isn't relevant to that section. It might warrant mention in the Safety concerns-Solid Rocket Booster O-rings section since that discusses the prelude to the disaster. Hard to be precise without seeing the source. VQuakr (talk) 19:49, 30 July 2021 (UTC)[reply]

@VQuakr: i'm okay with losing the 1986 stuff, i understand what you're saying there. it's kind of included in the congressional investigation bit anyways, but at least i have direction on what we need.

it could be that the lockheed complaint has nothing further concerning safety (i believe aerojet was alleging safety issues as well), but given how the GAO quoted only certain passages it's not out of the realm of possibility that others did raise this concern.

really excited the GAO is pulling everything. i hope if it's expensive there's some kind of slush fund they can tap for documents deemed to be 'in the public interest'.

i wouldn't be surprised if this is the first time everything surrounding the decision has been requested.

it'd take 25 years after 1973 for any requestor to have a remote chance at unredacted documents.

asking for them nearly 50 years later makes it a near-certainty that there is no sensitive/proprietary technology because of patent expiration, thereby implying any redactions would be to protect identities of employees and the likes.

i'm actually excited now. and i agree, we'd have to read what's there. but i'm fairly confident no book covering this matter has gone farther than the GAO reports just due to the patents. 198.53.108.48 (talk) 20:01, 30 July 2021 (UTC)[reply]

@VQuakr: update on PRI-21-182 at the GAO: i was told today by Information Disclosure Specialist (Supervisor) that there are no documents on file.

i have asked for confirmation that the physical archives have been inspected as well, given the substantial evidence stating the GAO possessed these documents at one time.

i have also asked for additional information about the absence of these documents. specifically if there is any record of their deletion because it is very strange they do not even have the original complaint on file.

i think they'll get back to me when they have the answer.

anyways, when i was speaking to them about this unusual absence of documentation, i have found possibly a better source to support the claim. it turns out that, while i may be the first to formally file the FOIA for this information at the GAO (i think), the NYTIMES did something similar in 86 and found the golden nugget or "smoking gun" that was requested.

"A rival company, worried about astronaut safety, in 1973 specifically warned that integrity of the O ring is largely a matter of faith. Thirteen years later, it was the rubbery O-shaped seals that failed between segments of a Thiokol booster, triggering the Challenger disaster."^[9]

i will also note that this article again references the same thing that you were deriding the Shupe source for: an inexplicable favouritism overwhelmingly suggestive of cult connections that resulted in the loss of lives. of course i won't be mentioning this in the inserted text, but it is something that should be considered worth mentioning. 198.53.108.48 (talk) 17:56, 5 August 2021 (UTC)[reply]

I'll wait for another opinion on this matter, but I don't think this NY Times articles has changed anything regarding the inclusion of the GAO report in this article. The NY Times article is from after the Challenger disaster, and its point is that Lockheed stated that the O-rings were a drawback for the Morton-Thiokol design, which we have already discussed in this talk page. The disaster certainly highlighted the SRB contract and would likely inspire journalists looking into the contract awarding process, but it is not like Lockheed was predicting the disaster. Balon Greyjoy (talk) 18:59, 5 August 2021 (UTC)[reply]

The GAO aspect of this isn't relevant to this article, and we already have a section that would comfortably accommodate a sentence on the 1973 concerns: Safety concerns/Solid Rocket Booster O-rings regarding Aerojet's concerns. This or this might be better sources for more detailed information than is contained in the NYT article, but it is reg walled. I can request a copy if no one here has an IEEE account. VQuakr (talk) 19:11, 5 August 2021 (UTC)[reply]

uh, the 1973 concern was voiced in response to the GAO investigation. there was no other avenue for this to come to light. time to go to dispute resolution because you have moved the goalposts. where are you getting the idea that a competitor could voice this issue in writing after the process has completed? the only way to do so is to launch a complaint to the GAO about the RFP. you cannot go to NASA about this. 198.53.108.48

i would like to add a new point about safety which i've emphasised throughout my responses above: the idea that safety was overlooked at the expense of cost-effectiveness. here is a philadelphia inquirer article^[10] where fletcher states:

"Safety was never mentioned," he said. "In retrospect, I probably should have asked more questions."

i want to relate this to the above discussion in the sense that, both @VQuakr and Balon Greyjoy: have emphasised the importance of not using retrospect, with which i agree. at the same time, is it acceptable to just assume all of the proposals met the requisite safety expectations when competitors were expressing reservations over different aspects of the design? we have aerojet stating issues with the o-rings, calling their reliability "largely a matter of faith" and we have lockheed concerned about the nozzle design that the SEB evaluation admitted needed a redesign.

at what point can the GAO report be ignored? it overturned the original decision on the base of cost effectiveness (not safety), but as VQuakr stated: since it did not perform a technical review, it trusted the SEB and NASA for those aspects. The GAO found the proposal costs were deemed within a margin by the GAO, thereby negating the strongest argument for considering the thiokol contract. this, to me, with their recapitulation of many problems outlined by the competitors, is enough to establish relevance because fletcher was asked to reconsider the award, but he did not at the time fletcher had the choice to change the award, he was aware of the concerns by lockheed and aerojet. he was aware the lockheed and thiokol proposals fell within the same reason for cost. but he refused to reconsider. why is this not relevant to the disaster? there were enough concerns raised by other competitors that it certainly gave him an opportunity to change that course. even if the reconsideration of the reward was not based on safety, there was evidence before him about safety concerns and the costs were deemed equal. it was a decision point that deserved more care, and that is why it is relevant and worth mentioning. (talk) 19:43, 5 August 2021 (UTC)[reply]

I have a copy of those IEEE articles now, not sure if you have full text yet. Feel free to email me for a copy. Aerojet argued safety as a factor for their field joint-free design, but the other three competitors all had field joints. Field joints are and were quite common on large SRBs so this strikes me as more marketing from Aerojet than a real argument that their design was the only safe option. GAO recommended overturning (again, based on economics not safety and not to Aerojet); it didn't have the authority to actually change the award. The decision to stick with Thiokol might have slightly affected the long-term economics of the shuttle program, but it didn't automatically doom Challenger. Lockheed's nozzle design concerns are completely irrelevant to this article since nozzles had nothing to do with the disaster. Of course in retrospect we know M-T's design was not at all safe, but if there was a "smoking gun" clear back in the proposal stage I haven't seen it. Management's willingness to ignore their engineers in the years leading up to the disaster are a matter of record, but the redesign of the field joints wasn't terribly difficult relative to the scope of the shuttle program (it just took a catastrophic failure for them to take it seriously). Put another way, the existence of Redesigned Solid Rocket Motors and their record without further problems suggest that there wouldn't have been disqualifying technical issues in the original proposal.

Tangential question - any concerns with [1]? VQuakr (talk) 07:07, 6 August 2021 (UTC)[reply]

Well done, VQuakr! Balon Greyjoy (talk) 08:48, 6 August 2021 (UTC)[reply]

@VQuakr:

• did the competitors' segmented rocket booster designs also use seals? if so, could you please at least provide proof that lockheed's segmented design used seals?

i think it is WP:SYNTHESIS to state aerojet's concerns are promotional rather than genuine.

for me to accept this line of thinking i would need to see some evidence of other competitors' designs using seals to legitimise your marketing argument.

• i disagree again with how you are looking at the GAO report.

yes, i agree it is not technical.

yes, it recommended reconsideration on the basis of cost-effectiveness.

but, what we know is at the time this report was issued was two separate competitors pointed out concerns with another competitor's design.

we also know fletcher just assumed every proposal would be safe, in his own words he admits that he should have thought more about safety in general at the time.

• my point of view on the GAO report is this: without retrospect, there were two separate issues pointed out by two different competitors against the same company (M-T)

it is not the cost equivalence that is important per-se, it is the fact that fletcher had an opportunity to reconsider changing the for whatever reason.

cost-effectiveness was merely the reason that allowed the recommendation for reconsideration.

that does not, in any way, preclude fletcher from reconsidering the award on other or additional merits outside of the cost.

this is where i feel the safety concerns raised by two other competitors, in addition to the original argument for cost-effectiveness being overturned by the GAO, were sufficient to show that fletcher bears some culpability.

• in summary about the GAO report

you are saying it did not relate to the disaster.

i am saying it negated the main argument for M-T (cost-effectiveness), and brought to light two separate concerns about the design from two other competitors.

i agree that, at this point, the GAO did not assess the technical merits of these concerns at that time.

but to dismiss these concerns (one as marketing, the other as not having a factor in the outcome) is with the benefit of hindsight

• another question i have about your marketing argument is: how would one competitor be able to see the proposal of another before submission?

the way i understand the RFP process (i know they vary, i've done a few) is that all bidders submit their proposal by some deadline.

i can't see how it would be permitted for one bidder to inspect another bidder's proposal before submitting their own.

that seems to fly in the face of fairness, especially if one submits earlier than another.

in short: i need to see evidence of two things for the marketing argument

1. that, at the very least, lockheed used seals for the segmented rocket booster design, and
2. other bidders were able to inspect eachother's bid prior to submission, establishing knowledge of eachothers' design.

alternative evidence i would accept for 2 is a few reliable sources that would establish some kind of public knowledge that each company had a 'known design' that could be critiqued by others.

if you can produce 1+2 then i can see how the GAO report is less relevant. as a decision-point, however, with the material fletcher had available to him (and not using hindsight), i believe he should have fully exercised the opportunity to change the award.