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Tonkin Gulf and the Escalation of the Vietnam War
On the night of August 4, 1964, the U.S. Navy destroyers Maddox and Turner Joy reported that they were under attack by North Vietnamese torpedo boats in the Gulf of Tonkin. Within hours, President Lyndon Johnson ordered the first U.S. airstrikes against North Vietnam, and on August 7, Congress passed the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, which gave President Johnson authority to take "all necessary measures" to prevent further aggression. Almost everyone on the two destroyers believed at the time that they were under attack. Some still believe so, while others have since decided that what had appeared on radar screens as torpedo boats had actually been false images generated by weather conditions, birds, or American planes overhead. In a careful reconstruction of that night's events, Edwin Moise conclusively demonstrates that there was no North Vietnamese attack. But the original report was not a lie concocted to provide an excuse for escalation; it was a genuine mistake. To put this error in context, Moise recounts the genuine battle between the Maddox and three North Vietnamese torpedo boats just two days before the phantom incident and describes the overall context in which the United States was drifting into war during 1964. He argues that U.S. policy was inconsistent: President Johnson's senior military and civilian advisors were drawing up plans to escalate the war, but, at the same time, Johnson was cutting the U.S. military budget instead of expanding it.
- GenresHistoryMilitary Fiction
304 pages, Hardcover
First published December 9, 1996
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Displaying 1 - 5 of 5 reviews
March 13, 2022
This is my second book by Edwin E. Moïse, and he again impressed me with the meticulousness with which he researches and chronicles. Although I have read only two histories and one memoir about the Tonkin Gulf incident so far, I can say without any doubt that Moïse's work ranks among the best written and most detailed works on the subject. I may even allow myself to go further and say that this is the most well-rounded and insightful book about the incident.
Moïse argues for the version that the Gulf of Tonkin incident was staged by certain American officials, probably the ones who were stationed in Saigon and were responsible for appointing the schedule of the 34A raids according to the schedule of the DeSoto patrols. What makes his narrative exceptional is that he pays attention to the smallest detail to prove his point. He draws upon never previously studied documents to analyze every movement of the American destroyers, every observation of the men on board the Maddox, and every report from the scene to emphasize the various inconsistencies. Many things in the official story just do not click.
Furthermore, unlike other historians, Moïse does not limit himself to the events in the Tonkin Gulf only. He never loses track of what was going on in Washington, at the highest level. It is true that we cannot be sure that the President or any other highest ranking official of the American government was involved in the conspiracy, but the overall mood in Washington at the time was militant. As the author observes, by August 1964, when the Gulf of Tonkin incidents occurred, America and North Vietnam were already "on a collision course." After the assassination of Ngo Dinh Diem, everything was going steadily downhill in South Vietnam, and it was obvious that the Saigon regime would not survive without largescale American intervention. The American government needed to justify their sending of American boys to die in a faraway Asian country, and in the good, old Pearl Harbor tradition, suggestions of staging a provocation began floating around. The ever gung-ho Joint Chiefs of Staff advocated for provoking the North Vietnamese. Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, who had previously been loyal to President John F. Kennedy's attempts to withdraw from Vietnam before it was late, switched sides after his assassination in Dallas and became one of the shrewdest, most influential architects of the American involvement in Vietnam. There were others too.
Was President Lyndon Johnson involved in the staging of the incident? Not necessarily. Did it benefit him? Yes, if he wanted congressional support for escalation. Moïse gave me plenty of food for thought, and after pondering about it for some times, I saw similarities between the Gulf of Tonkin and the Ngo brothers' assassinations. Contrary to what some historians believe, President John F. Kennedy never endorsed the overthrow of the Diem regime – nothing to say of the assassination of Ngo Dinh Diem. However, some of his aides conveniently assumed that a change in the Saigon government was what Kennedy wanted. The President did not find out about the overthrow and assassination of the Ngos until they occurred. Whether he ever found out that Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge collaborated with the rebel generals I do not know.
Similarly, Johnson might well have learned about the Tonkin Gulf incidents the way the rest of America did. However, if all the evidence is considered, the same can hardly be said about the American officials in Saigon.
TONKIN GULF AND THE ESCALATION OF THE VIETNAM WAR is a terrific read. Moïse has done an outstanding job, although the number of terms and the amount of detail might appear daunting for some readers. This book is the ultimate Gulf of Tonkin read, in my opinion, especially if one would like to cover the subject with one book, and to facilitate understanding, the author has included maps. I highly recommend to all Vietnam buffs.
Moïse argues for the version that the Gulf of Tonkin incident was staged by certain American officials, probably the ones who were stationed in Saigon and were responsible for appointing the schedule of the 34A raids according to the schedule of the DeSoto patrols. What makes his narrative exceptional is that he pays attention to the smallest detail to prove his point. He draws upon never previously studied documents to analyze every movement of the American destroyers, every observation of the men on board the Maddox, and every report from the scene to emphasize the various inconsistencies. Many things in the official story just do not click.
Furthermore, unlike other historians, Moïse does not limit himself to the events in the Tonkin Gulf only. He never loses track of what was going on in Washington, at the highest level. It is true that we cannot be sure that the President or any other highest ranking official of the American government was involved in the conspiracy, but the overall mood in Washington at the time was militant. As the author observes, by August 1964, when the Gulf of Tonkin incidents occurred, America and North Vietnam were already "on a collision course." After the assassination of Ngo Dinh Diem, everything was going steadily downhill in South Vietnam, and it was obvious that the Saigon regime would not survive without largescale American intervention. The American government needed to justify their sending of American boys to die in a faraway Asian country, and in the good, old Pearl Harbor tradition, suggestions of staging a provocation began floating around. The ever gung-ho Joint Chiefs of Staff advocated for provoking the North Vietnamese. Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, who had previously been loyal to President John F. Kennedy's attempts to withdraw from Vietnam before it was late, switched sides after his assassination in Dallas and became one of the shrewdest, most influential architects of the American involvement in Vietnam. There were others too.
Was President Lyndon Johnson involved in the staging of the incident? Not necessarily. Did it benefit him? Yes, if he wanted congressional support for escalation. Moïse gave me plenty of food for thought, and after pondering about it for some times, I saw similarities between the Gulf of Tonkin and the Ngo brothers' assassinations. Contrary to what some historians believe, President John F. Kennedy never endorsed the overthrow of the Diem regime – nothing to say of the assassination of Ngo Dinh Diem. However, some of his aides conveniently assumed that a change in the Saigon government was what Kennedy wanted. The President did not find out about the overthrow and assassination of the Ngos until they occurred. Whether he ever found out that Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge collaborated with the rebel generals I do not know.
Similarly, Johnson might well have learned about the Tonkin Gulf incidents the way the rest of America did. However, if all the evidence is considered, the same can hardly be said about the American officials in Saigon.
TONKIN GULF AND THE ESCALATION OF THE VIETNAM WAR is a terrific read. Moïse has done an outstanding job, although the number of terms and the amount of detail might appear daunting for some readers. This book is the ultimate Gulf of Tonkin read, in my opinion, especially if one would like to cover the subject with one book, and to facilitate understanding, the author has included maps. I highly recommend to all Vietnam buffs.
June 13, 2022
I didn’t learn a copious amount of new information in this book since I’m reasonably well read on the subject, but the writing is excellent, easy to understand and extremely well researched and detailed. I expect that it could be too detailed for some readers.
February 18, 2016
Not one of the world's great reads, but as close to a definitive analysis of what actually happened in the Gulf of Tonkin in early August 1964 as we're likely to get. Moise is a meticulous military historian, who has pored over every source that was available at the time he was doing his research. He comes up just of short of saying that absolutely nothing happened during the "second incident" that sparked the escalation of the Vietnam War, observing that it is just barely possible, though highly unlikely, that there was some initial contact. But clearly, the version that was taken, with great confidence, to the American public, to put the most charitable possible reading on it, was vastly misrepresented. I've always been a bit up in the air on what LBJ's long term plans in Vietnam were--in fact, he probably didn't have anything that coherent, not did McNamara or anyone else muddling through. But Moise did move me a bit towards the "escalation was nearly inevitable" position.
I learned a lot about the mechanics of communication on and between naval vessels, as well as the limitations of radar and sonar.
One of those books that, for most readers, is more important to know about than to read.
I learned a lot about the mechanics of communication on and between naval vessels, as well as the limitations of radar and sonar.
One of those books that, for most readers, is more important to know about than to read.
January 15, 2023
Great to learn about this aspect of American history. Very comprehensive of the events leading up to the Vietnam War. Difficult to read with the military jargon but very thoughtful and technical approach to the reporting of these events.
February 25, 2014
Did not finish it. A bit too detailed for me at present. But well written
Displaying 1 - 5 of 5 reviews