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Polish–Swedish War
Part of the Polish–Swedish War of 1600–1629 and Thirty Years War
Date 1626–1629 Location Baltic Sea, Prussia, Latvia, Poland Result Swedish victory Territorial changes Large parts of Livonia, including Riga, ceded to Sweden. Temporary Swedish control over Piława (Pillau), Memel, and Elbląg (Elbing)
Belligerents
Swedish Empire	Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth Holy Roman Empire
Commanders and leaders
Gustavus Adolphus Axel Oxenstierna Herman Wrangel Jacob De la Gardie Gustav Horn Jindřich Matyáš Thurn	Sigismund III Vasa Stanisław Koniecpolski Aleksander Gosiewski Jan Stanisław Sapieha Lew Sapieha Stanisław Potocki Samuel Pac Arend Dickmann Krzysztof Radziwiłł Hans Georg von Arnim-Boitzenburg

The Polish-Swedish War (1626—1629), also known as the Vistula Estuary War, was a key conflict between the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the Sweden, lasting from 1626 to 1629. The war was triggered by the aspirations of King Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden to gain control of the Vistula estuary, which would enable him to dominate Baltic trade and strengthen the Swedish position in the region. This war was part of a wider conflict for dominance of the Baltic Sea that lasted for several decades.

The war began in 1626, when Gustavus Adolphus launched a surprise attack on Royal Prussia. The Swedes quickly seized many important cities, including Elbląg, Malbork and Tczew, threatening the strategically important port of Gdańsk. The Polish army, led by the Great Crown Hetman Stanisław Koniecpolski, began a defensive campaign that led to a series of skirmishes and battles. An important event in this phase of the war was the Battle of Gniew in September 1626, which stopped the further march of the Swedish army deep into Poland. In 1627 the war moved to the sea, leading to the Battle of Oliwa on 28 November 1627. In this battle, the Polish fleet, commanded by Admiral Arendt Dickmann, was victorious over the Swedish fleet, which was important for the morale of the Polish forces and for defending access to the port of Gdańsk. In the following years, especially in 1628, there was further warfare on land, including the siege of fortresses and further clashes, such as the Battle of Trzciana on 27 June 1629, where the Polish army, under the command of Koniecpolski, was victorious, but the war still failed to produce decisive results.

Eventually, after exhaustive fighting, both sides decided to conclude a truce. On 26 September 1629, the truce was signed at Stary Targ (Altmark), under which Sweden retained control of most of the conquered ports, including Elbląg and Malbork, and gained rights to customs revenues from Baltic trade. Poland temporarily lost its influence in the region, which weakened its economy. The war was a significant event both for Sweden, which strengthened its position in the region, and for the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, which faced serious territorial and economic losses.

Gustavus Adolphus, after his successes in Livonia, turned his military focus towards Pomerania, with the strategic port city of Gdańsk as his main target. Controlling Gdańsk and the Vistula estuary promised Sweden significant revenue, which would be crucial for future operations against the Habsburgs in Germany. Although Gdańsk initially sought to remain neutral in the Polish-Swedish conflict, the city ultimately aligned with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, to which it owed much of its economic prosperity. However, the Commonwealth was unprepared for war; despite the Sejm's passage of substantial taxes to fund the army, the state was in debt, and its military forces were concentrated in Ukraine, leaving Pomerania vulnerable to Swedish attacks.^[1]

In the 17th century, Gdańsk was one of the most important trading ports in Europe, generating revenues comparable to the entire treasury of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. The city's wealth and influence allowed it to operate almost as a state within a state, with its own army, city militia, and independent foreign policy. The port's turnover was immense—during the 1720s, exports through Gdańsk and Königsberg totaled 5.5 million thalers, of which 80% passed through Gdańsk alone. The city leveraged the pan-European division of labor, where Western Europe focused on industry while Eastern Europe supplied raw materials and food, making the Commonwealth a crucial granary for millions across the continent.^[1]

As the Swedish invasion began on 23 June 1626, a large armada carrying 14,000 soldiers landed at Piława,^[2][3] quickly capturing it along with Braniewo, and advancing towards key points in Pomerania, including Elbląg and Malbork.^[4] In response, the Polish king organized a base of operations on the Great Żuławy, rich in food and fodder, and established forward positions near Tczew and Gniew. Gdańsk, though fortified on three sides, was vulnerable from the east, where the Swedes were advancing. The city responded by mobilizing its militia, enlisting 5,000 foreign soldiers, and purchasing modern weapons.^[2] The defense was bolstered by flooding the Żuławy Gdańsk, using a stone embankment along the Vistula, which delayed the Swedish advance and allowed the citizens to build additional fortifications and successfully defend the Vistula crossings with the help of a small Crown force.^[4][5]

Gustavus Adolphus's landing in Prussia, although expected by the Polish government, introduced anxiety at court because of the rapid successes of the Swedes. There was a fear that these advances might provoke other enemies of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, such as Bethlen Gábor, Duke of Transylvania, who sought revenge for the earlier actions of the Lisowczyks in Hungary, or Moscow, desirous of retaliation for the 'sorrow' and Polish intervention. There was also the fear of attack by Turks and Tartars, as well as German Protestants led by Count Ernest von Mansfeld, fighting against Catholics in Silesia. In this critical situation, the position of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in the international arena was extremely precarious, which created a sense of threat and fear for the future of the state. At the same time, the internal political situation of the Commonwealth was very complicated. The nobility's support for King Sigismund III was shaky, mainly because of his pro-Pope and pro-Habsburg policies, which many nobles opposed. Opposition leaders such as Krzysztof II Radziwiłł, princes Jerzy and Krzysztof Zbarascy and voivodes Tomasz Zamoyski and Rafał Leszczyński refused financial support and sought to undermine the king's authority and even dethrone him.^[6] Even loyal senators disagreed on strategy, suggesting the immediate dispatch of a detachment under Prince Władysław to Prussia to stop the Swedes. King Sigismund III, fearing that a quick victory for the Swedes would consolidate their position in Pomerania, advocated a more considered and larger campaign, even though this meant delaying hostilities.^[7]

Despite initial fears, the situation gradually began to improve. It turned out that none of the potential external enemies, apart from the Tatars, had attacked the Polish borders. The nobility, which had previously been indifferent to the fate of Inflants, enthusiastically welcomed the decision to embark on a general expedition against Gustavus Adolphus. The loss of Inflants aroused in them a sense of guilt and patriotism. At the Sandomierz assembly, the castellan of Czersk, Mikołaj Giżycki, called on the nobility to support the king in the war against Sweden, reminding them that the nobility's previous mistakes had led to the present situation. The unity of the nobility brought about a change of attitude among the opposing magnates, who, having no choice, sent their troops to the war, and some of them took part in it themselves.^[7] This uniting of the nobility gave King Sigismund III energy and enthusiasm, which had a positive effect on the morale of the army. Soldiers, mobilised for the expedition, enthusiastically prepared for battle, believing that they had a chance to restore Polish control of Pomerania and repel the Swedes. At this point, the Poles' underestimation of their opponent's strength, resulting from their earlier successes on the battlefield, began to gradually change, although they were not yet fully aware of the threat posed by the Swedish forces.^[8]

The concentration of the Crown troops took place near Toruń, where by the beginning of September some 7,000 soldiers had gathered, including court troops, a Pospolite ruszenie from Royal Prussia and private magnate posts. Still missing, however, were the quartered troops under Field Hetman Stanisław Koniecpolski, who had hitherto guarded the southern borderlands against the Tartars. King Sigismund III, fearing the difficulty of conquering the fortified strongholds in Warmia without heavy artillery, decided to move along the Vistula towards Gniew, hoping to provoke Gustavus Adolphus into a pitched battle in the open. The royal army reached Grudziądz, where it merged with the troops of the Pomeranian voivode, Melchior Weiher, and then circled Gniew, garrisoned by a weak Swedish garrison. At this time Gustavus Adolphus, having learned of the approaching Crown troops, changed his plans and moved to relieve them, bringing with him 1,700 cavalry, 8150 infantry and 74 guns. Sigismund III broke the siege of Gniew and turned back to face the Swedes.

Although the Swedes attempted to break into Gniew along the dyke, the Polish cavalry responded quickly, but the fire superiority of the Swedish infantry tipped the balance of the battle. The first day's fighting ended inconclusively, although the Poles were close to victory, but a lack of decisive leadership on the part of Sigismund III meant that all forces were not used. The following days saw an increase in the strength of both sides, but the Swedes' fire superiority and their organised defence proved crucial. Despite attempts at counterattacks, Polish cavalry, including the Hussars, failed to break through the Swedish positions. Sigismund III was forced to retreat to Czarlin, where he organised a fortified camp, blocking the Swedes' passage near Rokitki, which was crucial for further action towards Gdańsk. Although the Battle of Gniew ended in a tactical victory for the Swedes, their strategic position was difficult. The approaching winter and difficulties with supply across the Baltic, which was often stormy, put Gustavus Adolphus at a disadvantage. The Poles, although suffering losses, gained time to reorganise and consolidate their positions in the region, which promised a prolonged battle of attrition.

The transfer of decisive warfare to Prussia caused the Livonian front to lose its importance. After the Battle of Bovsk, a three-month truce was concluded, valid until 15 June 1626. The Lithuanian divisions, divided between Radziwill's and Sapieha's forces, continued to operate independently. In June, Aleksander Gosiewski, Voivode of Smolensk, took command of Radziwiłł's division. Taking advantage of the weakening of the Swedish troops, most of whom had been transferred to Prussia, Gosiewski took the offensive against the Swedish garrisons, succeeding in several clashes on the open field. Encouraged by his successes, he summoned General Jacob de la Gardie, the new Swedish commander in Livonia, to a pitched battle, but the latter refused, postponing the clash until a more favourable moment.

In the autumn, after reinforcing the Swedish forces in Livonia, de la Gardie took offensive action. On 30 September, he attacked Gosiewski's camp near Zelbork, using his superiority in firepower, which initially broke the Lithuanian lines. Although Gosiewski managed to boost the morale of his soldiers by personally motivating them, the battle ended unfavourably for the Commonwealth troops. Shortly afterwards, at Wenden, Lithuanian Colonel Samuel Pac was repulsed by the troops of Colonel Gustav Hom, further weakening the morale of the Lithuanian soldiers, who had long been demanding their outstanding pay. In the face of these setbacks, negotiations began, punctuated by sporadic fighting. On 3 December, the Swedes drew the Lithuanians into an ambush near Wenden, forcing them to retreat beyond the Dvina. As a result of this defeat, the Lithuanians lost their captured castles and agreed to a truce, concluded on 19 January 1627 at Baldenmojza, which lasted until 11 June of the same year.

After taking command in Prussia, Stanisław Koniecpolski immediately decided to exploit the strengths of Polish cavalry, using tactics familiar from earlier clashes with the Tartars. The Swedish army, composed mainly of infantry and with little movement, was taken by surprise by the rapid advance of the Polish cavalry, which struck at its lines of communication, supply bases and deep rear. Already the first cavalry actions during the march to Czarlin had significant effects — the Poles took several towns from the Swedes, interrupted communications between Żuławy, Braniew and Piława, and obstructed communications between Swedish garrisons. These effective actions so alarmed Axel Oxenstierna that he sent desperate calls for help to Gustavus Adolphus, convinced that he was facing at least a 20,000-strong Polish army. As a result, the bold manoeuvres of the Polish cavalry forced the Swedes to adopt defensive tactics and take refuge in their strongholds, allowing a satisfied Koniecpolski to temporarily hand over command to Colonel Mikołaj Potocki, himself going to the Sejm in Toruń.

The sessions of the Sejm, which lasted from 10 to 29 November 1626, ended with tax resolutions to provide approximately 2.2 million złoty for the Crown and Lithuania. It soon became apparent, however, that the funds raised were insufficient for a long and costly campaign. As a result, throughout the war in Prussia, the authorities of the Commonwealth constantly struggled to keep the army in the field and prevent rebellions or the formation of confederations. The winter of 1626/1627 brought further difficulties. The storming of Puck in December failed, as did attempts to capture Tolkmicko and Frombork. A peasant revolt broke out in Żuławy, desperate for continued plunder from undisciplined and starving Crown soldiers. Disease was rampant in the army, desertions occurred and horses died of starvation. The Swedes quickly realised the weakening of the Commonwealth's forces, as reflected in Oxenstierna's letter to Colonel Maximilian Teuffel of 22 January 1627, in which he wrote that the enemy was weak and that attempts to shell Puck had ended in heavy losses.

The harsh winter conditions did not spare the Swedes either. Gustavus Adolphus soldiers, cut off from the country for six months, occupied territories devastated by the autumn raids and suffered from hunger and disease resulting from unhygienic living conditions. As a result, the infantry regiments lost 35% of their numbers, the raiders 27% and the German and Scottish regiments 20%. Crown troops also suffered significant losses during the winter. In the spring of 1627, only 8,000-9,000 Crown troops and 4,000-5,000 Gdańsk troops stood against some 15,000-17,000 Swedes.

In the spring of 1627, after the ice on the Vistula River had moved, the material situation of the Crown army improved, allowing Stanisław Koniecpolski to take more vigorous action. The Swedes, under the command of Oxenstierna, devised a plan for a two-sided attack on the Polish army, intending to attack from the east and west. The German army under the command of Colonels Johann Streiff and Maximilian Teuffel was to make its way to Puck through Kashubia or attack the Polish camp near Czarlin. Koniecpolski, having learned of the entry of the entourage into Pomerania, decided to defend himself on two fronts: on the Lębork-Człuchów line and on the Vistula line. He moved his camp from Czarlin to Starogard and Skarszewo, and blocked the Pomeranian border with his cavalry flags, making it impossible for the Swedes to coordinate their actions effectively.

Koniecpolski, taking advantage of the flooding of the Vistula in March, gained a strategic advantage and began operations against the German entourage, who by this time had reached Szczecinek. Streiff and Teuffel, leading a small force, decided to withdraw to Puck, where they wanted to defend themselves under the protection of the entrenchments. Koniecpolski, with 3,000 soldiers and a dozen or so guns, moved on to Puck, where the Swedish garrison, weakened by starvation, capitulated on 2 April. The Hetman set mild conditions for the capitulation, allowing the Swedes to leave with their weapons for Piława, but all the guns, ammunition and looted booty were seized by the Poles. After the fall of Puck, Koniecpolski moved swiftly against the entourage, who, on hearing the news of the surrender, retreated across Pomerania in an attempt to make their way to Gniew.

Despite repeated attempts to break through the Polish ring, the German raiders failed to escape the siege. On 15 April Koniecpolski launched a decisive attack on their positions near Czarne, which led to the Sweden's capitulation. The German soldiers, heartbroken by the situation, arrested their commanders and called on the Poles for talks. On the following day, the act of surrender was signed, under which the German infantry was incorporated into the Polish ranks, and the raiders surrendered their weapons, swearing that they would never again fight against the Commonwealth. A solemn surrender ceremony was held on 18 April, during which the German soldiers laid down their arms before the hetman. Despite the initial opposition of the Polish soldiers, who were hoping for more booty, the defeated were allowed to leave. The victory was of great strategic importance, forcing the Swedes to withdraw from the west side of the Vistula and limit their operations to the eastern areas.

After the victory at Hammerstein, the material situation of the Polish army began to deteriorate. Lack of funds for the payment of soldiers' pay caused increasing problems with maintaining discipline among the soldiers, who were increasingly inclined to mutiny. At this difficult juncture, Sigismund III managed to obtain the consent of Emperor Ferdinand II to enlist soldiers in the Habsburg countries, which was crucial for the further conduct of the war. The Emperor, embroiled in a nine-year-long war with the Protestant camp supported by Sweden, had his own interest in prolonging the Polish-Swedish conflict, which delayed Gustavus Adolphus intervention in Germany. Meanwhile, the economy of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, weakened by constant wars, was particularly affected by the conflict in Gdańsk. The seizure of the Vistula estuary by the Swedes drastically reduced port traffic, which caused a trade crisis, unemployment and a decline in export earnings.

In the spring of 1627, when the Swedish fleet had not yet set sail, the Polish navy showed surprising activity. Polish ships attacked Swedish merchant ships, supported Koniecpolski's actions at Puck, and even tried to blockade the port of Riga. However, on 1 May a powerful Swedish squadron arrived on the Polish coast, and was joined by another, even stronger squadron the following day. In the Battle of Leba, three Polish warships, supported by an armed schooner, fought a fierce battle against three Swedish vessels, demonstrating the growing skill of the young Polish fleet. Meanwhile, Gustavus Adolphus landed at Piława with a new army, increasing the Swedish army in Prussia to 20,000 men. Koniecpolski, with just over 14,000 Crown soldiers and 4,000 Danzig soldiers at his disposal, had to face this formidable force, despite having ten times weaker artillery. The decisive battle took place near Tczew. Gustavus Adolphus, aware of the difficult situation of the Polish army due to overdue payments of wages, decided to cross the Vistula and strike at Gdańsk. On the night of 22-23 May, the Swedes attempted to ford the river at Kieżmark, but surprise failed, and King Gustavus Adolphus was wounded by an accidental shot. Koniecpolski, having held his forces, undertook skilful defensive manoeuvres which led to a clash at Tczew on 7 August 1627. Although the Swedes were outnumbered in numbers and artillery, Koniecpolski showed great command talent, saving the army from total defeat and inflicting significant losses on the enemy.

Although the Battle of Tczew did not result in a decisive victory, it saved Gdańsk from capture. Gustavus Adolphus, severely wounded, had to retreat to camp, and further hostilities were halted for a long time. The Poles, although weakened, managed to retain their battle value, and the strategic success of the Battle of Tczew meant that Gustav Adolphus plan to smash Koniecpolski's army before the arrival of Austrian assistance failed. As a result, the Swedish king was later forced to withdraw to Sweden, leaving command of the troops in Prussia to Oxenstierna.

The campaign of 1627 brought Gustav Adolf numerous setbacks, as the Poles recaptured Puck and Gniew, smashed the Germans at Chern, repulsed attempts to force a crossing at Kieżamrk, and successfully resisted at the Battle of Tczew. In view of these defeats, the strategic goal of conquering Danzig became unrealistic for the Swedish king, leading him to consider leaving Prussia and heading for Germany. He made conciliatory proposals to Poland, offering a truce for 30 years, the return of Prussia and Livonia for high compensation, but the 1627 Sejm decided to continue the war without passing the necessary taxes. After rejecting the Swedish proposals, Gustavus Adolphus faced further disappointment when the Netherlands refused to support him financially, demanding a peaceful solution to the conflict with Poland. In the absence of external support, the Swedish king decided to continue the war with his own forces, seeking to force the most favourable terms of peace.

The year 1627 brought the Swedes an unexpected defeat at sea, when the Polish fleet, rested and well supplied, surprised the Swedish squadron blockading the port of Gdańsk. In the autumn, most of the Swedish ships sailed for Sweden due to storms, leaving only six vessels under the command of Vice Admiral Nils Stiernskóld to maintain the blockade. When the Polish squadron under Admiral Arend Dickman put to sea on 28 November, a battle ensued in which the Poles, with 1160 soldiers and sailors and about 175 guns, clashed with the weakened Swedes. The battle began with a duel between the admiral ships Saint George and Tigern, ending with the surrender of the Swedish flagship. Shortly afterwards, the Polish Wodnik attacked the larger Swedish Solen, which, after a fierce battle, was blown up by its skipper to avoid capture. Although the Battle of Oliwa was only an episode in the Polish-Swedish war, not changing the balance of power in the Baltic, it was of great importance to the Poles, strengthening their faith in the capabilities of the Polish fleet and emphasising the need to expand it.

The warfare in Livonia, which resumed in June 1627, was of little significance, mainly because of the Swedes clear fire superiority, which meant that minor clashes usually ended in their successes. The Lithuanians, lacking a prominent commander, were limited to an uphill warfare that demoralised the soldiers and prevented effective sieges. The highlight of these operations was the successful expedition of Colonel Gustav Hom from under Riga to Semigallia, but overall the 1627 campaign, like the earlier ones, exposed the lack of strategic vision on the Lithuanian side. There was a shortage of artillery and infantry, and the poor quality of the cavalry, weakened by starvation and internal disputes among the commanders, further aggravated the situation.

In response to the domination of the Swedes in terms of tactics and weaponry, Stanisław Koniecpolski and Krzysztof II Radziwiłł attempted to reorganise the army, although they realised that these were only ad hoc measures. Koniecpolski increased the number of musketeers, recruited dragoons who were perfectly suited to work with the cavalry, both on horseback and on foot, and changed the proportions between infantry and cavalry, in favour of the former, to better oppose the enemy. Despite the rapid reforms, the Polish army was still inferior to the Swedes in terms of technology and organisation. The nobility, however, was unaware of the rising costs of war and continued to rely on traditional military formations, unwilling to increase financial outlays. By the end of 1627, the state's debts to the army amounted to at least 1.25 million złoty, and the country's economic situation was deteriorating further. The blockade of Polish ports by the Swedes and the imposition of customs duties on all merchant ships further aggravated the economic crisis of the Commonwealth.

On his return from under the Lighthouse, Gustavus Adolphus camped near Tczew, but due to the actions of the Polish cavalry he moved to the Żulawy of Gdańsk. In August 1628, leading 14,800 troops, he moved near Grudziądz to ravage areas hitherto untouched by the war. However, his march was stopped by Koniecpolski's army at the Ossa crossing, where a series of clashes took place. Three times the enemy armies faced each other, but each time they dispersed without a fight to their camps. Despite a quick march to Brodnica, where the surprised garrison capitulated, on the way back the Swedes suffered heavy losses due to Koniecpolski's masterful handling of the war of attrition. One Swedish officer, Salvius, described the dramatic state of Gustavus Adolphus's army, which had lost more than 5,000 men since marching out from above Ossa due to starvation, disease and attacks by Polish cavalry. The situation of the Crown army was also deplorable, as unpaid troops threatened to mutiny, agreeing to serve on credit only thanks to the Hetman's persuasion.

The 1628 campaign in Prussia was a major setback for the Swedes, although Koniecpolski was accused of tardiness and procrastination, which was painted somewhat unfairly in public opinion. The nobility did not realise the enormity of the Swedish army's technical superiority, and warfare in Inflants was even more sluggish. Throughout the year, there were only a few minor melees, which consolidated the existing holdings of both sides on the Dvina and Evicta lines. Despite this, Koniecpolski, disillusioned with Old Polish methods of warfare, continued to emulate Gustav Adolphus' tactics, building bridges, pre-bridge entrenchments and conducting more active manoeuvre warfare, which allowed him to achieve some successes. By the end of the campaign, however, both the Swedish and Polish armies were struggling due to war conditions and a deteriorating material situation.